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Foreclosing the Future in Macbeth,
Hamlet and “Agnotocene” Climate Policy
CHARLES WHITNEY

The assumption that young people will somehow figure out a way
to undo the deeds of their forebears has crept into and spread like
a cancer through U. N. climate scenarios.
—James Hansen

A

s environmental decline continues, attention to the topic of
intergenerational justice in and outside of literature is likely to increase.
For “democratic citizens,” classicist Elizabeth Markovits says, “must
develop a set of self-directed practices that better acknowledge citizens’
connections across time, cultivating a particular orientation toward themselves as
part of much larger transgenerational assemblages.”1
Such assemblages are surely crucial to navigating the insecurities of the
Anthropocene. In 2015 youthful plaintiffs in the Netherlands sued their
government for failing to protect the environment they will inherit. They won, and
the judge ordered the government to step up its defenses against climate change.
A similar American suit has endured separate dismissal motions by the Obama
and by the Trump administrations, has prevailed, and will now go to trial in
Oregon. That suit appeals to the Public Trust Doctrine as a means of facilitating
those transgenerational assemblages.2
As exemplified by the above epigraph, at the international level there has
been a parallel betrayal of younger and future generations--as well as a range of
other groups—primarily because the United Nations series of climate summits
over the last twenty-five years has reflected the dominant political and economic
forces of its constituent nations. Special interests compete; renewables vie with
fossil fuels and green economic planners with neoliberal capitalists who resist the
regulations and emissions targets that the summits exist to prescribe.3 So while
the December 2015 U. N. Paris climate summit agreement, though non-binding,
was in one sense a difficult achievement that could possibly be built upon,
greenhouse gases are now reported to contribute to 400,000 deaths a year,4 and
their increasing concentration in the atmosphere has created an all but
insurmountable problem, one that the present neoliberal world economic order
has failed to address.5
A major 2015 shift in policy toward a technological solution to climate
change provides a striking example of the marginality of the world’s publics to
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matters of climate policymaking. The policy was soon widely denounced among
experts but neither it nor the tremendous consequences it bodes have been
featured significantly in major U. S. news sources apart from an editorial or two.
Yet it is now integrated into climate-change planning around the world. Recently,
leading environmental writer Elizabeth Kolbert offered a trenchant critique of the
policy, interviewing people who are actually working on it and concluding that it
“has become vital without necessarily being viable.”6 For it has become vital only
because of “the hopelessness of the alternatives,” since, as one informant
observed, “‘nobody else has a good option.’”7
The 2015 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report and
2015 U. N. Paris summit agreement had to contain plans that at least looked
plausible. So both depend on this highly speculative carbon-capture technology, a
true deus ex machina that reduces pressure to adopt a genuinely “good option”: a
crash program to shift to renewables8--whether or not that interferes with the
process of capital accumulation and the usual definition of economic growth. At
some point teachers and administrators in any discipline, at any level, may feel
obliged to address the implications of what appears to be a moral and legal offence
of staggering proportions, a capitulation to business-as-usual and to climate chaos
for youth and future generations everywhere, especially among the poor and in the
developing world, where the ravages of climate change generally have and will
come sooner and with greater force.
Perhaps we should not expect Shakespeare’s oeuvre to be among the most
resonant on the topic of climate justice and specifically intergenerational climate
justice. There, intergenerational conflict mostly involves intimate family dynamics.
To choose the most obvious genre, tragedy, however, Romeo and Juliet stands out,
with a plot involving populations as well as individuals, since life in Verona is
marked by an inherited, lethal feud mentality laid to the doors of the elderly heads
of the families. The child sacrifices and murders in Titus Andronicus also have an
explicit sociocultural basis (“Barr’st me my way in Rome?” asks Titus before
murdering his son).9 But Macbeth and Hamlet may offer the most compelling cases
for presentist interpretation along these lines partly because in them characters can
plausibly stand for groups, forces, or attitudes. The former play offers
manipulation of information (riddling prophecies), victimized children, the
question “why?” and finally what could have been--that is, a glimpse of human
community in harmony with nature. Hamlet features a case study in
intergenerational injustice: a child whose life is commandeered by a recklessly
obsessed father and who becomes, too late, a kind of political insurgent. Such
material may provide the relevant nuance and depth for presentist application.
Following Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz among others,
I adopt a notion of the Anthropocene that begins in the early modern period,
because it is the take-off point for humans’ hugely expanded agency in re-shaping
the natural world, as well as in objectifying, externalizing, and instrumentalizing
it.10 The concept provides a context for linking issues of intergenerational justice
in Shakespearean drama to those in the present environmental crisis, where the
climate summits (with our without U. S. participation) are providing a sort of
ongoing tragedy. My approach to the Anthropocene concept rejects the assertion
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that it incriminates all humans or the human species itself. On the contrary, the
Anthropocene provides the opportunity for a great achievement, climate justice.11
The term “Agnotocene” in my title is one of Bonneuil and Fressoz’s
several coinages highlighting different aspects of the Anthropocene—for instance
Thermocene (rise of CO2 emissions), Thanatocene (destruction of nature),
Phagocene (consumerism), and, notably, Capitalocene. 12 “Agnotocene”--era of
enforced ignorance--refers to the continuous ideological “production of zones of
ignorance” (198) in “a modernizing unconscious” (199) that authorizes
environmental mayhem by obscuring or trivializing it. Such forces operate in the
news media and in all levels of education today; the Agnotocene came into its own
only with the decline of regimes dependent on outright censorship, such as those
of early modern England. But on the psychological level, wishful thinking, selfdeception, and repression appear to be age-old parallels that figure crucially in
tragic characters like Macbeth and Hamlet’s Ghost.
The tragic scenarios enacted by today’s climate policymakers as well as
the designs of Macbeth, Hamlet’s Ghost, and Hamlet have created, or promise to
create, tremendous havoc while frustrating those designs entirely or substantially.
Hamlet, however, is distinguished by finally achieving recognition of what the
context of environmental politics reveals as his true duty—which is not to fulfill
his father’s horrifying demand but to murder the dangerously unfit Claudius for
the good of a rotten state and for Hamlet’s own salvation. By no means does
Hamlet’s tardy insight avert tragedy, but it may provide a cue relevant to our
present. And here I must start with the tragedy of the present—a time so
vulnerable to the Agnotocene’s shadowy forces—in order to enable presentist
readings of tragedies past.
Bonneuil and Fressoz provide a tour of the Agnotocene. Highlights
include early nineteenth-century apologists for the new industrial society who
engaged in the production of ignorance by convincing enough of the public that
Dickensian factory work was harmless, thereby prefiguring today’s Kochbrothers-funded climate deniers in and out of the U. S. Cabinet. According to anticontagionists of the day, the disease and poverty spawned by the factories was
instead caused by the prevalence of miasma and dirt in laborers’ communities.
Factory smoke was declared harmless to neighboring residents: despite whatever
observers, doctors, or workers might say, the air was universalized “into a majestic
atmosphere, an immense receptacle in permanent equilibrium” (206). In that way,
“the local and global effects of industry were minimized and nature became a mere
externality” (206).
The authors expose other kinds of blinkered mentalities fostered and
protected by capitalist ideology of the Agnotocene variety. In the procedures of
mainstream economics for over a hundred years, the environment has undergone
a progressive “dematerialization” as the exponentially growing economy of the
Anthropocene has been disconnected “from any material substratum” (209). For
instance, the rules for calculating GDP (Gross Domestic Product) first established
by a team of U. S. economists in 1936 “naturalized the idea of the economy as a
closed circuit, a circular flow of value between production and consumption cut
off from its natural moorings” (214). In 1949, at the start of the Great Acceleration
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that is still going strong, some of those economists argued that ever-rising GDP
figures should be reduced by the value of those “natural moorings” lost through
environmental pollution and the depletion of resources, among other things. They
were unsuccessful. But had such environmental factors somehow been included,
there would have been “a steep decline of U. S. GDP figures from the 1970s on”
(215). And had that happened, those figures would now comprise a needed
warning rather than, as they do, a false comfort. For today in almost every nation
the fetish of an ideologically driven GDP elides awareness of daily environmental
destruction and decline.
Given the importance of GDP figures today for just about every nation
except Bhutan (it prefers the Gross Happiness Index), the elision of
environmental harm in those figures is crucial in addressing the shortcomings of
climate-change policy. It enables what mainstream economist Roger Pielke Jr. calls
that policy’s “iron law”: “When policies focused on economic growth confront
policies focused on emissions reductions, it is economic growth that will win out
every time.”13 But if we did calculate GDP according to that more comprehensive
alternative method, the iron law would melt: “policies focused on emissions
reductions” would in the long run improve the economy’s resilience through wise
use of resources and tight restrictions on emissions. However, Sharon O’Dair’s
article in this volume shows that, however GDP is calculated, at this late date
developed nations would have to launch a policy of planned de-growth. But
Pielke’s iron law really underscores the leaden inertia of a meticulously curated
ignorance that benefits capital and fosters today’s dominant economic mindset in
the failing struggle against environmental crisis and climate chaos.
Perhaps Elizabeth Kolbert was influenced by that mindset when she
wrote of the “hopelessness” of our situation. Surely the deep U. S. Agnotocene
has facilitated the right’s current assault on the environment, licensed by an evilclown czar adept mainly at distraction.
The thinking behind Pielke’s Agnotocenic, fantasy “law” seems broadly
applicable to the U. N. climate summits. The founding document, drafted in Rio
in 1992 and fully ratified in 1994, called for preservation of the climate system
while enabling “economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” 14
The level of compliance has been obscene, and the measurement of
“development” has always been closely tied to GDP growth rather than measures
of quality of life as favored by, for instance, ecological economists.15 Altogether
it’s been a forfeiture of immense consequence, a profound generational injustice
that required robust agnotological work, both to lose sight of the true goal, and,
with the help of predictably irresponsible reporting, to underplay the failures and
forfeitures from the public.
Hence the resort to carbon-capture technology in the 2015
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, and then in the 2015
Paris summit agreement, to make the numbers come out. That same year Oliver
Geden, a German climate security expert and insider at the summits, exposed the
plot of this Agnotocene tragedy in the making, first in a leading scientific journal
and then, strategically, in a New York Times op-ed shortly before the Paris
conference began. As greenhouse-gas emissions continue to rise beyond
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expectations worldwide, policymakers have been obliged to direct scientists to
produce official reports that keep deferring the date by which those emissions
must start dropping to stay within the 2° C target temperature rise. To compensate,
scientists who continue to cooperate (Geden recommends they do not) have been
obliged to increase the projected rate at which emissions must drop in earnest after
that deferred date. That increase is reckoned to be beyond the capability of a world
economy that would still be hooked on fossil fuels and capital accumulation, so
the negative emissions technologies will simply have to take care of it somehow.
Geden declares that limiting temperature rise to two degrees “is scientific
nonsense”; in his op-ed he stresses that the public needs to know more than it
does, and to be a party in decision-making.16
Some of the other experts who have weighed in here include Kevin
Anderson of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, who in a nice
pentameter called carbon capture and storage (CCS) “a carbon-sucking fairy
godmother.”17 Nine months on from Paris, a scientific team led by a former head
of the IPCC, Sir Robert Watson, warned about its risks, unknowns, and
challenges.18 Referring to the currently most popular form of CCS, bioenergy with
carbon capture and storage (BECCS), Watson and his team warn of risks “such as
competition for food, land and water to grow the necessary biomass.”19 For to be
effective BECCS, astoundingly, would require perhaps 12% of the world’s arable
land to grow biomass, an area bigger than India. (The biomass gets burned in huge
ovens that catch the CO2 and pipe it underground with a stern injunction not to
leak).
The following month (October 2016) the most famous climate scientist,
James Hansen, offered the above epigraph’s comment on that very technology in
his own study at Columbia University, “Young People’s Burden”:
Quietly, with minimal objection from the scientific
community (Anderson, 2015, is a courageous exception),
the assumption that young people will somehow figure out
a way to undo the deeds of their forebears, has crept into
and spread like a cancer through UN climate scenarios.
Proposed methods of extraction such as bioenergy with
carbon capture and storage [BECCS] or air capture of CO2
[DAC] imply minimal estimated costs of 104-570 trillion
dollars this century, with large risks and uncertain
feasibility.20
Whatever their degree of dubious success, invocation of BECCS and
other negative emissions technologies reduces pressure to move beyond fossil
fuels. On the contrary, it and the Agnotocene and Capitalocene practices that
accompanied its rise to a kind of stealth prominence bolster the power of elites
and reduce the possibility that we and those who come after can grasp our power
as citizens. Climate economists and policymakers seem fettered to the terms of the
very social and economic system that has presided over the development of the
crisis, and unable to think beyond it. Will the Anthropocene see more exploitation
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and victimization of those who come after, or can it be a new chance for human
rights solidarity?
In the Agnotocene as in the genre of tragedy, what goes around comes
around. A tragedy’s latter acts and the Anthropocene’s latter-day biospheres
promise the most suffering, and in those climates-to-come, to adapt Edgar’s
closing words, the oldest will have borne least and those “that are young Shall never
see so much” pain “nor live so long.”21
Macbeth’s ambition, masculine prowess, and willingness to try extreme
measures to reach his goal chime with early modern, Anthropocenic celebrations
of human, or at least male, capabilities. They also recall the Prometheanism
described by geoengineering advocates Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger
of the Breakthrough Institute. While the great majority of qualified experts reject
geoengineering as a policy because of its unpredictable consequences, they
recognize the danger that a small number of people or a single nation could
undertake it. But rejecting “the romantic preservationists,” Prometheans celebrate
the ability of the human to “refashion its world” “by means of technological
ingenuity.”22
The paltering fragments of prophecy croaked out by the Weird Sisters, to
which Macbeth clings with desperate optimism, parody the unlikely projections of
climate-change policymakers that manage to appear plausible. The prophecies
equivocate with creative literalisms involving Macduff’s mother dying in childbirth
and a creative military tactic (sneaking up on Dunsinane under sylvan camouflage).
The equivocations of the Paris agreement mislead by suggesting that the measures
it agrees to adopt, including BECCS, will keep things under control, and business
may continue as is, with modifications that are nothing like the deep cuts in
emissions called for by the data. As for motives, the Weird Sisters enjoy using their
equivocations to tempt an ambitious thane and war hero, and to watch how he
defeats himself and creates havoc for others. Today the powers that be settle for
a false solution that benefits them by preserving the present distribution of power
and wealth.
To wreck the climate is to visit the sins of the fathers on the children. The
Macbeths do not speak of children as ends in themselves. After being rewarded
for his heroic service in battle, Macbeth tells Duncan “our duties Are to your
throne and state, [like] children and servants” (1.4.24-5). Lady Macbeth associates
the murder of Duncan with cruel treatment of a figurative infant of her own,
framing her mind for murder by praying that her breast milk become gall (1.5.4546). She tells Macbeth he has “an eye of childhood” (2.2.52) due to his fear to look
upon Duncan slain. And her vehement rhetoric of infanticide is key to convincing
him to murder his king:
I have given suck, and know
How tender ‘tis to love the babe that milks me:
I would, while it was smiling in my face,
Have pluck’d my nipple from his boneless gums,
And dashed the brains out, had I so sworn
As you have done to this (1.7.54-59).
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“His boneless gums”: in Shakespeare’s England mothers came under
unwarranted suspicion of infanticide through smothering, an act that could
threaten the husband’s lineage.23 Lady Macbeth brazenly uses that anxiety to goad
her partner. Yet after Macbeth becomes king, rather than going about to generate
a male heir himself with his “dearest partner of greatness” (1.5.9-10), he goes after
potential rival successors to his throne, failing to murder the most important
targets. He has Banquo murdered, as one destined to beget kings, fretting because
the assassins could not eliminate Banquo’s son Fleance as well. Duncan’s son and
heir Malcolm is safely out of his reach, but Macbeth tries to corrupt him (4.3.11719). When Macduff joins the forces ranged against Macbeth, the latter, on impulse,
succeeds in killing the thane’s wife and children, a bright idea he calls one of the
“firstlings” of his heart (4.1.163), as if it were a child. Eventually his first victim’s
child leads an army to defeat him. Are his actions any less lethal than the
equivocations of our own Paris policymakers?
Originally Macbeth was an unwilling villain: he has “no spur To prick the
sides of my intent” (1.7.25-6) And he never articulates why he commences his
spree, though he provides excellent reasons why he should not murder his first
victim, Duncan: he could be found out and punished; he is transgressing as a
trusted kinsman, subject, and host; Duncan is upright and blameless and his
murder would be lamented unbearably (1.7.16-25). Macbeth dares not probe and
articulate his own motives, for working them out might dissuade him. So he
becomes a creature of the Agnotocene, driven by senseless reasoning, by a
malevolent agency he tells himself he senses in the natural world at night, and by
the firm resolve of another, Lady Macbeth. Once he gets over the trauma of his
first murder and his confrontation with Banquo’s ghost, Macbeth decides that
from then on he is “in blood Stepped in so far” that “Returning were as tedious
as go o’er” (3.4.135-37). Could there ever be a sensible answer to why we are
risking the end of everything, why it seems like for us “Returning were as tedious
as go o’er”?
When Macbeth hears that his lady has killed herself, his moving soliloquy
denies the continuity time and the meaningfulness of both human effort and the
future itself. (“Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow . . . ” [5.5.18-27]). That
fragmented state of mind seems oddly familiar today. According to psychologist
and climate-change educator George Marshall, surveys show that denial of the
future in the sense of believing that the world will end soon, or in the sense of not
being able to imagine the future, has become widespread among children and preteens in the U. S. and Australia.24
On the other hand Macbeth offers a brief glimpse of what could have
been: humans and other creatures living together in a peaceable kingdom. This is
the fraught moment when Duncan and Banquo admire Macbeth’s Glamis Castle
(1.6)--right after Lady Macbeth has declared her fixed desire to murder Duncan
that very night. As he and Banquo ride up to the castle, unsuspecting Duncan
would be looking forward to a closer relationship with Macbeth, who has saved
Scotland from invasion, but Banquo, as we soon learn (2.1.1-9), would have to be
somewhat concerned about the havoc Macbeth might wreak to bring those strange
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prophecies into reality. Their exchange begins and ends with praise of an
important consideration in humoral medical theory--good air--and that of this
“pleasant seat” is nimble, sweet, and “delicate” (1.6.10). There Banquo notes the
“procreant cradle” of the “temple-haunting martlet,” testament to the quality of
the air, “heaven’s breath” (1.6.3-8) Despite Banquo’s misgivings, his vocabulary
makes Macbeth’s castle a place where human and natural worlds thrive in health
and fulfillment under the blessing of heaven. He calls our attention, we of the
Anthropocene, to the necessity of hope and purpose in the face of terrible
knowledge.
Hamlet’s plot chimes with the current, outrageous assumption noted by
Hansen “that young people will somehow figure out a way to undo the deeds of
their forebears.” Hamlet is burdened not with undoing any selfish and
irresponsible deeds of his father but with carrying out his father’s selfish and
irresponsible demand, one that for Hamlet precludes, as the child climate-change
plaintiffs have claimed in court, the right to one’s own life, liberty, and pursuit of
happiness. So burdened, Hamlet stands for younger generations faced not only
with ravaged environments but with monstrous conundrums like BECCS, the
legacies of selfish and irresponsible forebears, whether they are fossil-fuel
magnates, policymakers at U. N. summits, or all of us.
The Ghost appears to a beloved relative before consignment to Purgatory
not for the usual reasons of sentiment, desire for a boon that may shorten its
sentence, to visit a store of treasure, or to prophesy (see 1.1.111-19)—but in
resentment and desperation to sate its prideful grudge, to propose and thereby
collude in a crime of private revenge that must lengthen the Ghost’s sentence in
Purgatory if not reassign it to hell. Hamlet’s exclamation “And shall I couple hell?”
(1.5.93) soon indicates his misgivings, which eventually prompt him to arrange the
Mousetrap, to test both Claudius’s guilt and find out if the Ghost is really his
father’s or a demon in disguise. But after the Ghost’s departure Hamlet exclaims
to his companions, “The time is out of joint: o cursèd spite, That ever I was born
to set it right” (1.5.189-90): the Ghost has burdened him with a conundrum that
will claim his life henceforth, and not only in this world but perhaps in the next as
well. For in the third soliloquy (“To be, or not to be”) Hamlet also becomes vividly
aware that tangling in the Ghost’s affairs could adversely affect his own lot within
in the “bourn” of the afterlife’s “undiscovered country” (3.1.81).
When Hamlet is drawn from the platform to follow his father’s Ghost he
knows not where, the guard Marcellus utters the immortal line “Something is
rotten in the state of Denmark” (1.4.67, italics mine), throwing into contrasting
relief what will turn out to be the Ghost’s overwhelmingly private and selfish
motivation. Its speech’s tenor of bitter outrage at gross violations of brotherly and
spousal trust reveals a dignified but driven shade too like the demon from hell
Hamlet suspects him to be, an imposter parent working to damn the child rather
than equip him for the world. It is only when Hamlet is able to embrace his duty
to that state—rather than any parental injunction to private revenge—that he fully
reconciles himself to the murder of Claudius.
The Ghost’s rhetoric aims to overwhelm its listener with anger and
indignation, but when that effect subsides, other considerations come into play.
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John Kerrigan argues that Hamlet wants to remember his father as he was alive,
not revenge his death--unless, perhaps, he could manage to kill Claudius when his
sins are unrepented, as Claudius did his father.25 But by the time Hamlet returns
from England, even such an exquisitely recapitulative private revenge seems to
have become the least of many motivations for killing Claudius. Unfortunately it
has taken a tragic length of time for Hamlet to get straight about what his duty
really is.
For not until the play’s last scene does he define his purposes as state
matters, as Marcellus had divined in the first act. Hamlet speaks of himself to
Horatio as a kind of citizen who bears a special responsibility to remove Claudius
from power, which requires Claudius’ death. He lists a set of motives for regicide
without mentioning his personal relationship to his father. That relationship has
become political: his father is now just “my king”—that is, all Denmark’s king-and the justification for regicide rests on an ethical and religious sense of duty, and
on what Claudius has done not to his father but to him and to his mother.
Does it not, think’st thee, stand me now upon—[rest
upon me as duty]
He that hath killed my king and whored my mother,
Popped in between th’election and my hopes,
Thrown out his angle for my proper life,
And with such coz’nage—is’t not perfect conscience,
To quit him with this arm? And is’t not to be damned,
To let this canker of our nature come
In further evil?
(5.2.63-71 [italicized lines are only in the Folio edition]).
Now Hamlet aspires to be the principled assassin of an evil ruler, as justified during
the period in treatises by John Ponet and by an unknown author.26 He wishes to
address a state matter best dealt with by him as the member of the royalty most
personally harmed. A measure of his transformation is that where before he
worried that his killing Claudius would risk heaven’s wrath in that “undiscovered
country” after death, Hamlet now believes he is risking damnation by not killing
Claudius and thereby inviting “further evil.”
In a presentist application Hamlet calls for exposure of the extreme
generational injustices incident to the Agnotocenic dimension of our
Anthropocene period, since in that period power depends crucially on obscuring
the destruction of the environment by producing zones of ignorance that threaten
to foreclose the future for us and those who come after. Hamlet models a labor of
understanding as prelude to transgressive action.
If an economic and political revolution in the name of justice seems
appropriate today to manage a many-faceted environmental crisis, there is another
frame compatible with the Anthropocene that may be helpful in linking
intergenerational justice in Shakespearean tragedy and in the climate crisis: Franco
Moretti’s theory concerning tragedy’s paradoxical power to undercut reverence for
England’s monarchy--to “deconsecrate sovereignty”—and yet its inability to
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ground a viable alternative in its own time.27 For today’s ongoing tragedy of fatally
compromised efforts to mitigate climate-change disaster has, in the eyes of many,
inadvertently provided something like a deconsecration of capitalism 28 —but,
again, one that may or may not ever find a way to ground a viable alternative.
Further, in each case the profane-making became or will become part of huge
societal changes: the English Civil War and Revolution then and whatever the
intensifying effects of the Anthropocene and our responses to it may bring.
The tragic stage made majesty the subject of scrutiny and judgment. In
the Tudor period, political power was progressively centralized in the Crown. So
the stage fleshed out compelling but flawed figures of authority like Macbeth and
Claudius who find themselves possessed of enormous power, with predictably
catastrophic results that helped dissipate audiences’ awe for the system. But the
Crown’s censors would not approve plays that debunked monarchy or centered
on positive representations of alternative forms of polity that distributed authority
widely—hence the stage’s failure to ground an alternative.
True, in Shakespeare’s time, as the early modern British monarchy
continued to drift in the direction of absolutism, an alternative was clear: some
system of republicanism as exemplified positively by the Venice of Othello and with
a measure of respect by the ancient Rome set forth in Coriolanus and Julius Caesar.
But, Andrew Hadfield concludes, by the early seventeenth century the way
forward for republicanism as more than a set of ideas and topics for discussion
proved cloudy in the short term. Despite James I’s many shortcomings--not least
his explicit absolutist ideology--his reign was warmly greeted by John Marston’s
The Malcontent (1603) and Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure (1603-4), plays
celebrating hereditary, wise, and resourceful rulers. These plays suggest “that
republicanism is no longer a viable, current political philosophy.” 29 Hadfield’s
conclusion helps validate application of Moretti’s thesis to the remarkable number
of tragic masterpieces produced within a few years of those plays, including Hamlet
and Macbeth. Their considerable political resonances tended to deconsecrate
sovereignty, but did not present salient political alternatives.
But forty-odd years later there was a revolution and England became a
republic, as tragedy’s profane-making finally found definite grounding in a shortlived republic some of whose ideals were more effectively realized later, in 1688.
And so may the ongoing deconsecration of capitalism today find grounding, if
engaged citizens apprehend its role in the continuing failure to address the general
environmental crisis, and then leverage the strength of alliances not only across
cultures, races, and classes, but also generations, like the alliance of adults and
children in their lawsuit against government fecklessness today.30
As the English Civil War raged, Thomas Hobbes was writing Leviathan,
which justifies absolutism as the only regime powerful enough to end the chaotic
conditions of his time. In their recent Climate Leviathan, Joel Wainwright and Geoff
Mann argue that if a climate-justice movement is unsuccessful the most likely
alternative will be an absolutist Climate Leviathan.31 As the only regime powerful
enough to attempt to control the social and political chaos exacerbated by climate
change, that regime will navigate through ever-declining environmental conditions
as long as it can while protecting the interests of capitalist elites. Climate Leviathan

185
Early Modern Culture 13

Shakespeare and the Anthropocene

would also surely try to insure that the Anthropocene remains also an Agnotocene.
In such a bleak world the fragmentary A Massacre at Paris might seem more relevant
than the threads of hope and affirmation in Shakespearean tragedy or, say, Dr.
Faustus.
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